This page is no longer updated, and is the old forum. For new topics visit the New HOL forum.
Tunisia Terrorism - It's time to get tough
Register | Edit Profile | Subscriptions | Forum Rules | Log In
leggedstruggle  Croydon 02 Jul 15 4.46pm |
|
|---|---|
|
Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 4.01pm
Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 1.45pm
kill them The voices in your head? As opposed to the Boy's own Guide to Postmodern Philosophy that appears to be in yours?
mother-in-law is an anagram of woman hitler |
|
 Alert a moderator to this post |
 |
| TheJudge 02 Jul 15 5.44pm |
|
|---|---|
|
Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 12.00pm
Quote TheJudge at 02 Jul 2015 11.33am
Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.57pm
Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 9.07pm
Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 4.38pm
Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 4.24pm
Most of what you say is generally reasonable but I would remind you that the IRA nearly killed the entire Cabinet and there were not really many active IRA members. A similar action would constitute a serious threat to national security I would suggest. They didn't nearly kill the entire cabinet, they managed to bomb the Brighton Hotel and launch a rocket attack on Downing Street. Neither attack would likely have resulted in the loss of the entire cabinet, and civil contingencies exist that can deal with that event anyhow. The number of active IRA members, doesn't really describe the effectiveness or size of the organization. The Provisionals generally had very few active service units in operation at any given time. Those cells would carry out attacks and bombings, but they were supported by other cells that dealt with this like logistical support, intelligence, counter intelligence, operational planning etc that all would then be fed to an ASU. Someone would build the bomb, another group would move it from the bomb maker to the armoury, another group would then supply it to the ASU would would deploy it, and then another group would have set up 'escape plans' for the ASU (and many of these groups would have little or no interaction) - It makes the most of skill sets and allows focused training (and in theory makes it harder to infiltrate) So you might have three active service units on the mainland, of say 15 people in total, but they would be backed by a much larger organization.
Sounds like you wouldn't get twitchy until the IS flag was flying over Parliament. Glad you're not in charge. Not really, I like to understand how things work and operate. I think its vital to understand an enemy, who it is, what it wants, how it functions etc if you want to defeat it. This isn't a conflict that can be won purely on a militarily basis.
Military, psychological, ideological, sociological and economic. The best way to defeat an enemy is to deprive it of its capacity to fight and then its will to fight. Interestingly one of the core foundations of ISIS (at least in Iraq) is the accumulation of a significant portion of the Sons of Iraq, who prior to the US pull out, were operating as a paid support force alongside the US troops. Many of these 'Sons' had prior Iraqi military and Police experience, and were previously involved with the anti-US Insurgency, but they also were fairly well paid by the US and turned out to be effective if somewhat unwilling allies. The US paid better than AL-Qaeda, and the Sons knew who was allied with which factions. In 2009 the US passed all responsibility over to the Iraqi government, who promptly ceased paying the Sons of Iraqi, rendering them unemployed, and so they ended up signing up with Insurgent groups and Sunni Militias again. Then when the Syria civil war began, the Iraqi insurgents and Sunni Militias began supplying the Sunni groups across the border with weapons and training, and as things grew they became more directly involved notably with the group that would become ISIS as it paid well, and had objectives that suited the outcomes sought by Sunni Nationalists. Consequently, ISIS rapidly gained access to a well trained (ex-Iraqi military, police and intelligence) force of about 15,000 or so experienced insurgents, that were well organized inside Iraq, and well established at fighting a guerilla war - allowing ISIS to tip the balance across the border regions in their favour. It also gave the capacity to IS to understand the weaknesses of the existing Iraqi army, and rout it quickly and effectively (as the Sons had been engaged against the Iraqi military for some time, and been collecting intelligence on it). Yes it's interesting how the complex webs that are weaved impact on the current situation. One is left wondering at which point between incompetence, design and the unpredictable these things sit.
|
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
|
| legaleagle 02 Jul 15 9.25pm |
|
|---|---|
|
Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 12.00pm
Quote TheJudge at 02 Jul 2015 11.33am
Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.57pm
Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 9.07pm
Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 4.38pm
Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 4.24pm
Most of what you say is generally reasonable but I would remind you that the IRA nearly killed the entire Cabinet and there were not really many active IRA members. A similar action would constitute a serious threat to national security I would suggest. They didn't nearly kill the entire cabinet, they managed to bomb the Brighton Hotel and launch a rocket attack on Downing Street. Neither attack would likely have resulted in the loss of the entire cabinet, and civil contingencies exist that can deal with that event anyhow. The number of active IRA members, doesn't really describe the effectiveness or size of the organization. The Provisionals generally had very few active service units in operation at any given time. Those cells would carry out attacks and bombings, but they were supported by other cells that dealt with this like logistical support, intelligence, counter intelligence, operational planning etc that all would then be fed to an ASU. Someone would build the bomb, another group would move it from the bomb maker to the armoury, another group would then supply it to the ASU would would deploy it, and then another group would have set up 'escape plans' for the ASU (and many of these groups would have little or no interaction) - It makes the most of skill sets and allows focused training (and in theory makes it harder to infiltrate) So you might have three active service units on the mainland, of say 15 people in total, but they would be backed by a much larger organization.
Sounds like you wouldn't get twitchy until the IS flag was flying over Parliament. Glad you're not in charge. Not really, I like to understand how things work and operate. I think its vital to understand an enemy, who it is, what it wants, how it functions etc if you want to defeat it. This isn't a conflict that can be won purely on a militarily basis.
Military, psychological, ideological, sociological and economic. The best way to defeat an enemy is to deprive it of its capacity to fight and then its will to fight. Interestingly one of the core foundations of ISIS (at least in Iraq) is the accumulation of a significant portion of the Sons of Iraq, who prior to the US pull out, were operating as a paid support force alongside the US troops. Many of these 'Sons' had prior Iraqi military and Police experience, and were previously involved with the anti-US Insurgency, but they also were fairly well paid by the US and turned out to be effective if somewhat unwilling allies. The US paid better than AL-Qaeda, and the Sons knew who was allied with which factions. In 2009 the US passed all responsibility over to the Iraqi government, who promptly ceased paying the Sons of Iraqi, rendering them unemployed, and so they ended up signing up with Insurgent groups and Sunni Militias again. Then when the Syria civil war began, the Iraqi insurgents and Sunni Militias began supplying the Sunni groups across the border with weapons and training, and as things grew they became more directly involved notably with the group that would become ISIS as it paid well, and had objectives that suited the outcomes sought by Sunni Nationalists. Consequently, ISIS rapidly gained access to a well trained (ex-Iraqi military, police and intelligence) force of about 15,000 or so experienced insurgents, that were well organized inside Iraq, and well established at fighting a guerilla war - allowing ISIS to tip the balance across the border regions in their favour. It also gave the capacity to IS to understand the weaknesses of the existing Iraqi army, and rout it quickly and effectively (as the Sons had been engaged against the Iraqi military for some time, and been collecting intelligence on it).
The failure to do so by the US/their S. Vietnamese allies (some would say puppets) was a pertinent factor in the way things went.Some felt the British did a better job in Malaya during the "emergency" and a pretty abysmal job in Kenya.There are those who think Bloody Sunday (and ensuing investigation) and Internment were disasters in terms of the broader big picture in unnecessarily alienating "hearts and minds".
|
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
|
| leggedstruggle Croydon 02 Jul 15 11.40pm |
|
|---|---|
|
Quote legaleagle at 02 Jul 2015 9.25pm
Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 12.00pm
Quote TheJudge at 02 Jul 2015 11.33am
Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.57pm
Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 9.07pm
Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 4.38pm
Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 4.24pm
Most of what you say is generally reasonable but I would remind you that the IRA nearly killed the entire Cabinet and there were not really many active IRA members. A similar action would constitute a serious threat to national security I would suggest. They didn't nearly kill the entire cabinet, they managed to bomb the Brighton Hotel and launch a rocket attack on Downing Street. Neither attack would likely have resulted in the loss of the entire cabinet, and civil contingencies exist that can deal with that event anyhow. The number of active IRA members, doesn't really describe the effectiveness or size of the organization. The Provisionals generally had very few active service units in operation at any given time. Those cells would carry out attacks and bombings, but they were supported by other cells that dealt with this like logistical support, intelligence, counter intelligence, operational planning etc that all would then be fed to an ASU. Someone would build the bomb, another group would move it from the bomb maker to the armoury, another group would then supply it to the ASU would would deploy it, and then another group would have set up 'escape plans' for the ASU (and many of these groups would have little or no interaction) - It makes the most of skill sets and allows focused training (and in theory makes it harder to infiltrate) So you might have three active service units on the mainland, of say 15 people in total, but they would be backed by a much larger organization.
Sounds like you wouldn't get twitchy until the IS flag was flying over Parliament. Glad you're not in charge. Not really, I like to understand how things work and operate. I think its vital to understand an enemy, who it is, what it wants, how it functions etc if you want to defeat it. This isn't a conflict that can be won purely on a militarily basis.
Military, psychological, ideological, sociological and economic. The best way to defeat an enemy is to deprive it of its capacity to fight and then its will to fight. Interestingly one of the core foundations of ISIS (at least in Iraq) is the accumulation of a significant portion of the Sons of Iraq, who prior to the US pull out, were operating as a paid support force alongside the US troops. Many of these 'Sons' had prior Iraqi military and Police experience, and were previously involved with the anti-US Insurgency, but they also were fairly well paid by the US and turned out to be effective if somewhat unwilling allies. The US paid better than AL-Qaeda, and the Sons knew who was allied with which factions. In 2009 the US passed all responsibility over to the Iraqi government, who promptly ceased paying the Sons of Iraqi, rendering them unemployed, and so they ended up signing up with Insurgent groups and Sunni Militias again. Then when the Syria civil war began, the Iraqi insurgents and Sunni Militias began supplying the Sunni groups across the border with weapons and training, and as things grew they became more directly involved notably with the group that would become ISIS as it paid well, and had objectives that suited the outcomes sought by Sunni Nationalists. Consequently, ISIS rapidly gained access to a well trained (ex-Iraqi military, police and intelligence) force of about 15,000 or so experienced insurgents, that were well organized inside Iraq, and well established at fighting a guerilla war - allowing ISIS to tip the balance across the border regions in their favour. It also gave the capacity to IS to understand the weaknesses of the existing Iraqi army, and rout it quickly and effectively (as the Sons had been engaged against the Iraqi military for some time, and been collecting intelligence on it).
The failure to do so by the US/their S. Vietnamese allies (some would say puppets) was a pertinent factor in the way things went.Some felt the British did a better job in Malaya during the "emergency" and a pretty abysmal job in Kenya.There are those who think Bloody Sunday (and ensuing investigation) and Internment were disasters in terms of the broader big picture in unnecessarily alienating "hearts and minds". We could try introducing Sharia Law, outlawing homosexuality, take the vote away from women, allow polygamy for men only, and make Islam the state religion. Those measures would go some way to winning their hearts and minds.
mother-in-law is an anagram of woman hitler |
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
|
| legaleagle 03 Jul 15 1.17am |
|
|---|---|
|
An interesting point of view.You would have been invaluable in assisting the US with its counter-insurgency strategy in Vietnam.
|
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
|
 Bert the Head Epsom 03 Jul 15 7.08am |
  |
|---|---|
|
Quote martin2412 at 26 Jun 2015 1.45pm
We have to stop fannying about. We need to get in and start wiping this scum off the earth. Modern day Nazis, except now everyone who's not a muslim is a 'Jew'
George Orwell, Notes on Nationalism, 1943
|
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
 |
| jamiemartin721 Reading 03 Jul 15 9.19am |
|
|---|---|
|
Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 4.46pm
Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 4.01pm
Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 1.45pm
kill them The voices in your head? As opposed to the Boy's own Guide to Postmodern Philosophy that appears to be in yours? It wouldn't be gender specific if it was postmodern
"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug" |
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
|
| jamiemartin721 Reading 03 Jul 15 9.27am |
|
|---|---|
|
Quote Jacey at 02 Jul 2015 4.23pm
Just a suggestion, but do you think the prospect of our 6 RAF jets will cause ISIL to quake in their boots, if we eventually agree to attack them in Syria, after the summer hols!! Not at all. It'll probably strengthen their resolve unless we get extremely lucky with the targeting. I doubt IS has a command structure, as it generally consists of affiliated groups operating independently. Given that its far more likely that the Tunsia attack was not IS but an affiliate based in Libya (where the individuals most likely trained and probably was equipped), I'd imagine it'd be largely pointless. What we should have done, is propped up the regimes of Assad and Gaddaffi, rather than associated ourselves with the rebels (and in Libya supported the rebels with air force and equipment). Groups like this florish in failed states, where they can provide sufficient force of arms and supply.
"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug" |
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
|
| jamiemartin721 Reading 03 Jul 15 9.36am |
|
|---|---|
|
Quote legaleagle at 02 Jul 2015 9.25pm
Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 12.00pm
Quote TheJudge at 02 Jul 2015 11.33am
Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.57pm
Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 9.07pm
Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 4.38pm
Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 4.24pm
Most of what you say is generally reasonable but I would remind you that the IRA nearly killed the entire Cabinet and there were not really many active IRA members. A similar action would constitute a serious threat to national security I would suggest. They didn't nearly kill the entire cabinet, they managed to bomb the Brighton Hotel and launch a rocket attack on Downing Street. Neither attack would likely have resulted in the loss of the entire cabinet, and civil contingencies exist that can deal with that event anyhow. The number of active IRA members, doesn't really describe the effectiveness or size of the organization. The Provisionals generally had very few active service units in operation at any given time. Those cells would carry out attacks and bombings, but they were supported by other cells that dealt with this like logistical support, intelligence, counter intelligence, operational planning etc that all would then be fed to an ASU. Someone would build the bomb, another group would move it from the bomb maker to the armoury, another group would then supply it to the ASU would would deploy it, and then another group would have set up 'escape plans' for the ASU (and many of these groups would have little or no interaction) - It makes the most of skill sets and allows focused training (and in theory makes it harder to infiltrate) So you might have three active service units on the mainland, of say 15 people in total, but they would be backed by a much larger organization.
Sounds like you wouldn't get twitchy until the IS flag was flying over Parliament. Glad you're not in charge. Not really, I like to understand how things work and operate. I think its vital to understand an enemy, who it is, what it wants, how it functions etc if you want to defeat it. This isn't a conflict that can be won purely on a militarily basis.
Military, psychological, ideological, sociological and economic. The best way to defeat an enemy is to deprive it of its capacity to fight and then its will to fight. Interestingly one of the core foundations of ISIS (at least in Iraq) is the accumulation of a significant portion of the Sons of Iraq, who prior to the US pull out, were operating as a paid support force alongside the US troops. Many of these 'Sons' had prior Iraqi military and Police experience, and were previously involved with the anti-US Insurgency, but they also were fairly well paid by the US and turned out to be effective if somewhat unwilling allies. The US paid better than AL-Qaeda, and the Sons knew who was allied with which factions. In 2009 the US passed all responsibility over to the Iraqi government, who promptly ceased paying the Sons of Iraqi, rendering them unemployed, and so they ended up signing up with Insurgent groups and Sunni Militias again. Then when the Syria civil war began, the Iraqi insurgents and Sunni Militias began supplying the Sunni groups across the border with weapons and training, and as things grew they became more directly involved notably with the group that would become ISIS as it paid well, and had objectives that suited the outcomes sought by Sunni Nationalists. Consequently, ISIS rapidly gained access to a well trained (ex-Iraqi military, police and intelligence) force of about 15,000 or so experienced insurgents, that were well organized inside Iraq, and well established at fighting a guerilla war - allowing ISIS to tip the balance across the border regions in their favour. It also gave the capacity to IS to understand the weaknesses of the existing Iraqi army, and rout it quickly and effectively (as the Sons had been engaged against the Iraqi military for some time, and been collecting intelligence on it).
The failure to do so by the US/their S. Vietnamese allies (some would say puppets) was a pertinent factor in the way things went.Some felt the British did a better job in Malaya during the "emergency" and a pretty abysmal job in Kenya.There are those who think Bloody Sunday (and ensuing investigation) and Internment were disasters in terms of the broader big picture in unnecessarily alienating "hearts and minds". I generally think that Hearts and Minds tends to be obfuscated from the reality on the ground and political agendas. Realistically the Taliban and IS aren't winning hearts and minds, but providing stability, employment and prospects. Its notable that IS has flourished in the badlands of Northern Iraq, Syria and Libya, all three countries (or in the case of Iraq regions). A large portion of IS fight because IS pays them well enough to (ex-Iraqi military and Iraqi Sunni insurgents). The enemy of my enemy is quite a common practice in insurgencies, rebellions and civil wars.
"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug" |
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
|
| leggedstruggle Croydon 03 Jul 15 9.48am |
|
|---|---|
|
Quote legaleagle at 03 Jul 2015 1.17am
An interesting point of view.You would have been invaluable in assisting the US with its counter-insurgency strategy in Vietnam. If you want to change the subject to Vietnam, they could have tried to win the hearts and minds of the communists by introducing a one-party state, gulags, the worship of Ho Chi Minh, the collectivisation of farmland (6,000 peasants massacred during a revolt), land 'reform' (at least 120,000 executed), rent 'reduction' (at least 200,000 executed).
mother-in-law is an anagram of woman hitler |
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
|
| leggedstruggle Croydon 03 Jul 15 10.11am |
|
|---|---|
|
Quote jamiemartin721 at 03 Jul 2015 9.19am
Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 4.46pm
Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 4.01pm
Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 1.45pm
kill them The voices in your head? As opposed to the Boy's own Guide to Postmodern Philosophy that appears to be in yours? It wouldn't be gender specific if it was postmodern There is a Girl's own Guide - very similar, but leaves out the bit on how immoral it is for women to have children.
mother-in-law is an anagram of woman hitler |
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
|
| jamiemartin721 Reading 03 Jul 15 10.38am |
|
|---|---|
|
Quote leggedstruggle at 03 Jul 2015 9.48am
Quote legaleagle at 03 Jul 2015 1.17am
An interesting point of view.You would have been invaluable in assisting the US with its counter-insurgency strategy in Vietnam. If you want to change the subject to Vietnam, they could have tried to win the hearts and minds of the communists by introducing a one-party state, gulags, the worship of Ho Chi Minh, the collectivisation of farmland (6,000 peasants massacred during a revolt), land 'reform' (at least 120,000 executed), rent 'reduction' (at least 200,000 executed). ARVN, US and Allies caused between 420 and 1m civilian deaths. The South Vietnamese government, during the war, ordered the deaths of 50-200,000 people (the US 4-10,000 people). Willbanks and Levy's research suggests as many as 220,000 civilian deaths were counted as 'VC casualties' rather than civilian casualties. A result of the use of Agent Orange was nearly half a million child birth defects. Turns out war and civil war is never nice.
"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug" |
|
| Alert a moderator to this post |
|
Login / RegisterNew users
Registration is now on our new message board
Existing users
To login with your existing username you will need to convert your account over to the new message board.
Sponsors
All images and text on this site are copyright © 1999-2024 The Holmesdale Online, unless otherwise stated.
Web Design by Guntrisoft Ltd.